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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CAROL JEAN SHAW, now known ) 
as CAROL JEAN SHAW LORD, 
Plaintiff and ) 
Appellant, 
) 
vs. Case No: 18367 
HAROLD ELIJAH SHAW, ) 
Defendant and ) 
Respondent. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT AND NATURE OF CASE 
This is an appeal by the plaintiff from an Order on 
Order to Show Cause Re Modification of Divorce Decree and a 
Supplemental Order on Order to Show Cause and the denial of 
miscellaneous motions by plaintiff filed thereafter. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The plaintiff filed an Affidavit and Motion For Order 
to Show Cause In Re Contempt, which matter was filed on 
September 22, 1980. A response to the Motion was filed by 
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the defendant, and through no fault of the defendant, the 
matter did not come on for hearing until December 18, 1981. 
Following the hearing, the court entered its Findings of 
Fact and conclusions of Law and Order on Order to Show Cause 
on February 5, 1982. Thereafter, the court entered a 
Supplemental Order on Order to Show Cause, which 
Supplemental Order was signed April 16, 1982. Thereafter, 
certain motions were made by the plaintiff and a plaintiff 
i.n intervention which were denied by the District Court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The defendant-respondent requests that the orders of 
the District Court be affirmed, and that the appeal be 
dismissed and that the matter be remanded to the District 
Court for the imposition of attorney's fees on appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent believes the Statement of Facts 
submitted by the appellant is inaccurate in that it appears 
to be her "version" of the facts. For that reason the 
respondent prefers to set out a different Statement of 
Facts. 
The pla.intiff and defendant were married on January 16, 
1959. The plaintiff and defendant had six children born as 
issue of this marriage. 
2 
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The plaintiff originally filed a summons and complaint 
for divorce in the District Court of Weber County, State of 
Utah, on January 13, 1978, (R.199-203). In the original 
divorce proceedings the plaintiff was represented by w. 
Brent West. The defendant was represented by Mann, Hadfield 
and Thorne. Over a period of some months, negotiations took 
place between the respective counsels, to arrive at an out 
of court settlement. 
On September 28, 1980, a written stipulation was 
ultimately reached between the parties to determine the: 
possession and the equity in the family home, custody of 
minor children, child support, alimony, debts and 
obligations, division of personal property, filing of tax 
returns, health and accident coverage, and the awarding of 
tax exemptions on the minor children. (R.208-210). 
The plaintiff then took a default divorce {R.207) and 
the "Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law" and "Decree of 
Divorce" were signed on October 11, 1978, to become final 
one month from date of entry. {R.211-215 and 216-219). 
On July 1, 1980, the plaintiff married her present 
husband, Robert L. Lord. {R.364, paragraph 5 of Findings of 
Fact). 
Under date of July 31, 1980, Robert Lord sent a letter 
to Mr. Shaw telling him he must continue paying alimony or 
Mr. Lord would collect it through court action. (R.239). 
3 
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Mr. Shaw had his attorney contact Mr. Lord and attempt 
to resolve the matter without court proceedings. Following 
telephone conversations a letter dated August 6, 1980 was 
sent to Mr. Lord outlining why Mr. Shaw understood alimony 
would terminate upon remarriage. (R.240). 
After other telephone conversations failed to resolve 
the question of alimony, Mr. Lord threatened and ultimately 
did file on August 29, 1980 a tort action against Mr. Shaw 
seeking to recover $256,500.00 for "alleged" torts committed 
by Mr. Shaw against his former wife during the time they 
were married. (R.241-242). Mr. Shaw believed and alleged 
that the tort action was filed to attempt to coerce him into 
accepting Mr. Lord's demands that he pay alimony. 
(R.227-228 paragraph 5; R.249 paragraph 5;) (T.98-99 note: 
transcript references are to stamped page numbers, rather 
than typed page numbers). 
The tort action was dismissed by the trial court on the 
defendant's motion .for summary judgment. The plaintiff, 
Mrs. Lord, has filed an appeal on that case which is now 
awaiting decision by the Utah Supreme Court. (see Lord v. 
Shaw, case number 17993). 
After failing to get Mr. Shaw to meet her demands, Mrs. 
Lord through her husband, Attorney Robert L. Lord, filed an 
"Affidavit and Motion for Order to Show Cause In Re 
Contempt". (R.221-224). In the original affidavit and 
motion filed on September 22, 1980 the plaintiff claimed the 
4 
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defendant was delinquent for child support and alimony for 
the months of July and August, 1980. The defendant filed a 
response with attached exhibits on September 23, 1980. 
{R.225-241). As part of his "Response", the defendant 
alleged that only three children were living with the 
plaintiff, that the minor child, Neil, had come to live with 
the defendant, and the defendant requested the court to 
determine what, if any, child support was in arrears for the 
months in question. 
The hearing was set for September 24, 1980, the 
plaintiff was not present but was represented by her 
counsel, Robert Lord. The defendant was present and 
represented by his counsel and was ready to proceed. The 
court declined to hear any evidence and determined to have 
the matter set for a one-half day hearing. {R.245). 
The defendant filed an "Amended Response" (R.246-266). 
The plaintiff filed: a "Motion to Modify" {R.267-268), a 
"Motion for Change of Judge" (R.269-270) and a "Notice of 
Trial". Trial was set for December 2, 1980. 
On December 1, 1980 the plaintiff filed an objection to 
the trial setting {R.295-297) and over the defendant's 
objections the matter was continued since Mr. Lord stated he 
needed to be a witness and desired to associate other 
counsel in the matter. 
Following this continuance the defendant attempted to 
have the matter set through various telephone calls to the 
5 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
court administrator's office. The defendant was finally 
advised that all of the district judges normally sitting in 
Weber County had disqualified themselves. 
Mr. Lord formally withdrew as attorney of record on 
August 17, 1981. (R.312). The plaintiff then filed an 
additional Affidavit and Motion to Reform the Divorce 
Decree. (R.313-316). 
The matter was finally set for hearing on December 18, 
1981, before the Honorable Douglas R~ Cornaby. 
At the time the matter came for hearing, the defendant 
had certain issues which it wanted determined by the court, 
and the plaintiff had certain issues which she desired to be 
heard by the court. The court indicated that it desired to 
have all of the issues heard since many had arisen in the 16 
months since the matter had originally been set for hearing. 
(T.54). 
It appears from the record that the issues which the 
parties presented for hearing were: 
(a) Whether alimony terminated upon marriage or 
whether it continued for a three-year period until September 
1, 1981, in spite of plaintiff's marriage. 
(b) What child support delinquencies, if any existed. 
(c) What child support obligation Mr. Shaw owed on the 
minor child, Neil, from the time he went to live with Mr. 
Shaw until he reached majority. 
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(d) Whether any child support should have been ordered 
for the oldest son, Rick. 
(e) Whether a change of circumstance existed, such 
that child support should be increased. 
(f) Whether the divorce decree should be amended to 
grant Mrs. Lord the tax exemptions for Federal and State 
income tax purposes. 
(g) How the court should award certain items of 
personal property in dispute. 
(h) Whether attorney's fees should be awarded to 
either side. 
(i) Whether the proceeds from the sale of the home 
should be awarded; and if so, how the proceeds should be 
divided between the parties. 
(j) Whether sanctions should be applied against the 
plaintiff for failure to answer the defendant's discovery 
requests. 
The plaintiff had three witnesses testify at the 
hearing: Carol Shaw Lord, the plaintiff; Robert Lord, her 
husband; and Brent West, her attorney at the time of the 
divorce. The plaintiff also introduced 6 exhibits. These 
exhibits were: a) her handwritten statement of her 1981 
income, b) a letter from Mr. Thorne to Mr. West, c) earning 
statements from Jordan School District, d) earning 
statements from Tender Touch Nursery, f) expenses testified 
7 
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to by Mr. Lord, and g) shelter expenses testified to by 
Mr. Lord. (R.360). 
The defendant had four witnesses testify at the 
hearing: Mr. Shaw, the defendant; Richard Shaw, the 
parties' son; Edna Gorley, a neighbor; and Evelyn Thompson, 
the defendant's mother. The defendant also introduced six 
exhibits: 1) a series of six letters between respective 
counsel prior to the divorce stipulation; 2) Mr. Shaw's 
record of expenditures; 3) Mr. Shaw's monthly living 
expenses; 4) seven copies of checks; 5) Mr. Shaw's record of 
child support payments; and 6) Mr. Shaw's proposed division 
of savings from the sale of the family home with attached 
documents. (R. 360). 
The court examined the exhibits and the testimony and 
issued a ruling from the bench. (T.172-197). The court 
essentially resolved the issues in favor of the defendant's 
positions. 
At the conclusion of the hearing on December 18, 1981, 
there was considerable discussion as to how certain credits 
and offsets should adjust the division of proceeds from the 
sale of the family home. The court went through those in 
great detail, and gave a decision as to how the various 
credits should be awarded. The court then requested that 
each party submit any affidavits they may have regarding 
payments made to fix up the home to have it ready for sale, 
8 
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and directed that they be done within 10 days from the date 
of hearing. (T.180). 
Following the submission of the affidavits, the court 
on January 4, 1982 by written ruling, (R.350) made his award 
of credits regarding the payments made by the plaintiff. 
The defendant was given a credit in the amount of $130.70 
for his share of expenses, which amount was apparently not 
objected to by the plaintiff. 
Mr. Shaw's counsel prepared the "Findings" and 
"Decree" and submitted them to the plaintiff for approval on 
December 31, 1981 (R.384). No response from the plaintiff 
was received. On January 12, 1982 and January 15, 1982, 
Mr. Shaw's counsel submitted some changes to the plaintiff 
(R.385,386) and again no response was made by the plaintiff. 
Finally on February 2, 1982, Mr. Shaw's counsel requested 
the court to review the "Findings" and "Decree" since no 
word had been received from the plaintiff. {R.387). 
The court signed the Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law on February 5, 1982, and also signed the Order on 
Order to Show Cause Re Modification of Divorce Decree (see 
R.361-375). 
Under letter dated February 3, 1982 the plaintiff sent 
to Mr. Shaw's counsel revisions to the Findings which were 
totally different than the judge's decision. By letter 
dated February 8, 1982 the plaintiff was apprised that the 
9 
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Findings and Order prepared by the defendant were signed by 
the judge on February 5, 1982. (R.398). 
On March 3, 1982 the plaintiff filed a Motion and Order 
for Extension of Time to File an Appeal (R.376-377), which 
was actually filed in person by Robert Lord, who had 
previously withdrawn from the case. At the time Mr. Lord 
filed the Motion the court set a hearing on April 5, 1982 to 
resolve any questions including the allowance of claims for 
repair costs to the home to get it ready for sale. 
(R.456-457). 
After the defendant received a copy of the Motion of 
Extension to File an Appeal, the defendant filed an 
objection to the motion for the reason that an extension of 
time would da~age the defendant in that the defendant had 
over $16,000 equity from the sale of the home which had been 
tied up since September of 1980, and the defendant had still 
not received any money from his share of the proceeds. 
(R.381-388). 
Mr. Stanger then withdrew as attorney of record (R.380) 
and Ronald c. Barker entered an appearance. (R.379). on 
March 23, 1982, the plaintiff then filed a Motion to Vacate 
Findings, Conclusions and Judgments (R.399-401) and filed 
her proposed Findings and Order. (R.402 1 406). The defendant 
filed his objection to the Motion to Vacate and his 
objection to the plaintiff's proposed Findings. (R.389-398). 
10 
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The plaintiff then filed a Notice of Appeal on April 2, 
1982 (R.419) and failed to notify either the court or 
opposing counsel that she would not appear on the previously 
set April 5, 1982 hearing. 
On April 5, 1982 the defendant and his counsel appeared 
but neither the plaintiff, her husband, or her counsel 
attended. The Court had to telephone the plaintiff's 
attorney to see why they were not in court. The Court was 
told that since they had filed a notice of appeal the 
previous Friday, they did not intend on appearing at the 
hearing. (T. 2) • 
The Court proceeded with the hearing and ruled that the 
"Findings" and "Order" submitted by the plaintiff did not 
reflect the Court's findings or decision. (R.458, T.2). 
The Court ruled that the failure of the plaintiff to appear 
waived any objection she may have to the Court receiving by 
affidavit the costs of repair to the home. The Court ruled 
that the proceeds from the sale of the home should be 
released to the defendant immediately except that $3,000 
should be put in a trust account pending resolution of the 
appeal. (T.11-12; R.458; R.476). The Court also ordered 
the plaintiff to pay attorney fees (T.11; R.476) and the 
court further ruled: 
"The actions of the plaintiff and Robert Lord, 
her husband and former attorney of record, 
appear to be designed to harass and designed 
to try to financially break the defendant, 
and are not a good faith legal effort by 
the plaintiff." (R.478 paragraph 7) 
11 
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(See also supplemental transcript of hearing 
held April 5, 1982, page 11). 
Following the hearing, "Special Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law" (R.473-478) and "Supplemental Order on 
Order to Show Cause" (R.453-455) were signed by Judge 
Cornaby. 
The plaintiff then filed an "Objection to the Entry of 
Order and Motion to Delay Entry of Order" (R.451). This was 
denied by the Court {R.456) who pointed out that the April 
5, 1982 hearing was set and held at the specific request of 
the plaintiff who then chose not to appear. 
Robert L. Lord on April 27, 1982 filed with the Court a 
motion entitled: "Motion to Intervene; Motion to Vacate 
Supplemental Order on Order to Show Cause; Motion to Vacate 
Special Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law; Motion to 
Vacate Ruling; Motion to Modify the Aforesaid; and Request 
for Oral and Evidentiary Hearing" {R.485-487) and also filed 
affidavits in support of the motions. 
On April 29, 1982 Mr. Barker withdrew as attorney of 
record for the plaintiff. {R.488). 
On April 28, 1982, Lowell Sununerhays filed as attorney 
for plaintiff a "Motion for New Trial, Motion to Vacate, 
Modify or Amend, and Request for Oral and ~videntiary 
Hearing" {R.469). Also on April 28, 1982, Robert L. Lord 
filed a "Motion for New Trial". On May 5, 1982, Judge 
Cornaby denied all motions filed. {R.472). 
12 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
As part of the April 5, 1982 hearing, the court 
specifically ordered that the monies currently held in 
Mountain States Savings in the names of plaintiff and 
defendant be divided equally, with $3,000.00 to be held in 
trust to cover any issues pending appeal, and the 
defendant's amount was to be turned over to him immediately. 
The Court also ordered that this condition would apply to 
the extension of time in which to file the appeal. Since 
the court order, the plaintiff has absolutely refused to 
cooperate or allow the same to be done. {R. 454). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ORDER REQUIRING DEFENDANT TO 
PAY ALIMONY TO PLAINTIFF WAS AUTOMATICALLY 
TERMINATED UPON PLAINTIFF'S MARRIAGE. 
The general rule in the State of Utah is that alimony 
terminates upon the marriage of the former spouse. This 
general rule has been declared to be state policy by the 
1979 Legislature. 
UTAH CODE ANN. §30-3-5(2) (Supp.1981) sets out this 
basic policy: 
"(2) Unless a decree of divorce specifically 
provides otherwise, any order of the court that a 
party shall pay alimony to a former spouse shall 
automatically terminate upon the remarriage of 
that former spouse, unless that marriage is 
annulled and found to be void ab initio in which 
13 
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case alimony shall resume providing that the party 
paying alimony be made a party to the action of 
annulment and that party's rights are determined." 
(emphasis added) 
Even prior to the announced legislative policy 
regarding terminating alimony upon remarriage, the Utah 
Supreme Court had clearly articulated the rule that alimony 
terminated upon marriage. 
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of Austad v. Austad, 
2 Utah 2d 49, 269 P.2d 284 (1954), clearly stated that in 
the state of Utah alimony terminates upon remarriage of the 
wife. In this regard the Utah Supreme Court made a rather 
lengthy discussion of a prior Utah Court case, which may 
have given some validity to the proposition that alimony 
would not terminate upon remarriage, and the Utah Supreme 
Court clearly overturned that prior decision. In this 
regard the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
"It appearing that the Myers rule has very little 
foundation in the decisions of the courts of our 
sister states, of our own state, or in reason, to 
induce us to adhere to it we conclude that 
notwithstanding what has been said in earlier 
cases, there is implicit in the divorce decree the 
provision that the alimony continues only so long 
as the wife remains unmarried. Accordingly the 
alimony awarded plaintiff terminated upon her 
1 
II 'd 58 remarriage.... ~· • 
The respondent appreciates that under the decision 
announced in the Austad case there may be some exceptional 
situations where alimony would not terminate upon 
remarriage. 
"In reaching this decision we are not to be 
understood as holding that the same result would 
14 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
eventuate where a sum of alimony was decreed in 
lien of dower, or in settlement of property rights 
acquired by the wife, or where the alimony is 
awarded in a lump sum payable in installments. 
And we further observe that under some exceptional 
circumstances this result might be so 
unconscionable or inequitable that the court, 
under its equitable powers would decree that the 
wife does not lose her right to alimony upon 
remarriage. In such instance the burden would be 
upon the wife to prove those facts." id. 58 
(footnotes omitted) 
In the instant case one is thus faced with determining 
whether the divorce decree "specifically provides otherwise" 
that alimony would not terminate upon remarriage or whether 
the alimony awarded Mrs. Lord was "in a lump sum payable in 
installments". 
The divorce decree reads as follows: 
"5. The Defendant further agrees to pay to the 
Plaintiff the sum of $125.00 per month as and for 
alimony. This alimony is to run for a period of 
three years, beginning October 1, 1978. At the 
end of that time, the Plaintiff agrees to 
permanently waive any future alimony. 
6. Both parties acknowledge that the Defendant's 
payment of the house payment is included as a part 
of the child support and alimony and is not in 
addition to those payments. The house payment 
will be made directly to the mortgage company on 
the first of each month. The balance will be paid 
directly to the plaintiff by the 20th of each 
man th • " ( R. 218) • 
There is nothing in the divorce decree or in the Findings of 
Fact to suggest alimony would not terminate upon her 
marriage. 
Also the language of the Divorce Decree does not mean 
the alimony was a "lump sum payable in installments". Lump 
sum alimony judgments have traditionally been characterized 
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by a specific sum being stated, after which a provision is 
included which stipulates the manner in which the sum is to 
be paid. The essence of lump sum is this stating of a 
specific sum certain. The installment payment provision, if 
such was decreed, was merely a method of carrying the 
judgment into effect. Instructive in this regard is the 
language of the court in Morris v. Morris (Fla. App.1973) 
272 So. 2d 203, wherein it reads: 
" •.. lump sum alimony may properly be paya.ble in 
installments, but in the cases reviewed the amount 
awarded was for a specific sum to be paid in 
full." 
Also see Cann v. Cann (Fla. App. 1976) 334 So.2d 325. 
The alimony provision in the present case is dramatic 
in contrast. The court stated no specific lump sum. The 
alimony provision was structured as a continuing obligation 
on the part of respondent to pay his former wife, a sum 
certain, that being $125.00 per month, which obligation 
would only last three years at the longest or until she 
remarried. 
The trial court clearly construed the alimony provision 
to terminate upon remarriage, and also found that the 
negotiations leading up to the stipulation provided it would 
terminate upon the plaintiff's marriage. 
The court in announcing its decision from the bench 
stated: 
"THE COURT: In ruling on this matter the Court 
will take the matters item by item. The Court is 
going to deal first with the alimony question. I 
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think [plaintiff's] counsel, of course, has 
objected to the Court going behind the decree, 
that the decree speaks for itself on its face, and 
the Court believes that the decree does soeak for 
itself on its face; but my interpretation-of what 
it says, obviously, is different than the way 
at least some of the way you are interpreting that 
matter. The court does not find this to be a lump 
sum alimony. The Court -- or in that kind of 
order the Court finds that was $125 per month 
alimony. It was contemplated that the plaintiff 
was going to stay single. While that may have 
been contemplated and then, as a matter of fact, 
worked out to be that way, this was just like any 
normal provision would have been put in a decree 
for alimony. I think that the provision 
terminates on marriage and the Court finds that 
the marriage did take place July 1st, 1980, and 
that terminated [alimony] at that time. If the 
Court goes behind the decree, and I believe that 
is the general -- that's the way the Utah law has 
it now, if the Court goes behind it and then 
begins to look at testimony offered today as to 
what the testimony between the parties are, I 
still come up with the same answer. The letters 
between counsel seem to be that that was an agreed 
thing, specifically, by the defendant, that it 
would terminate after three years or remarriage, 
and remarriage not having put into it. It's 
clear, too, from the plaintiff's testimony that 
she said that she intended it to run a full three 
years. The reason she intended it to run a full 
three years -- this comes from counsel and not 
from her -- is because she didn't anticipate 
marriage. She was in school and she was going to 
need it for that full period of time. At the time 
of remarriage the law has -- and has a presumption 
in that that responsibility ceases with the prior 
husband and falls to the present husband. And so, 
it's no longer on the defendant. {T.173-174). 
The court decision that the intent was that alimony 
would terminate upon plaintiff's marriage is amply supported 
by the record. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 a series of six letters clearly 
shows the parties agreed alimony would terminate upon her 
marriage. 
17 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Mr. Thorne's letter to Mr. West, dated September 14, 
1978 contains this provision: 
"Mr. Shaw would also pay $125.00 per month for 
alimony for three (3) years or until Mrs. Shaw 
remarries . " ( R. 3 6 0 ) • 
Mr. West's letter of September 20, 1978 to Mr. Thorne 
states: 
"This letter is to advise you that we have 
accepted the terms set out in your letter dated 
September 14, 1978, in regards to child support 
and alimony." (R. 360) • 
On cross-examination at trial Mr. West also admitted 
that the provisions in the September 14, 1978 and September 
20, 1978 letters was the final agreement reached on alimony. 
"Q (By Mr. Thorne) Were there any other further 
negotiations that you recall that we had which 
would provide that alimony was not to terminate on 
remarriage? 
A. No. the Only negotiations I recall is our 
exchange of letters. I recall no specific phone 
call between yourself and I where we actually 
discussed that, other than what was in the written 
correspondence. 
MR. THORNE: 
MR. FITT: 
That's all. 
You may come down, sir. Thank 
you. 
THE COURT: You may step down and be excused." 
(T. 9 4) • 
The appellant's position that the alimony was to have 
been paid for three years irrespective of her marriage is 
simply contrary to law and to the facts as found by the 
trial court. 
This Court has often stated the rule, ·that on appeal 
considerable deference will be given to the trial court's 
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findings. In Christensen v. Christensen, Utah, 628 P.2d 
1297, 1299 (1981) this Court stated: 
"[O]n review this Court will accord considerable 
deference to the judgment of the trial court due 
to its advantaged position and will not disturb 
the action of that court unless the evidence 
clearly preponderates to the contrary, or the 
trial court abuses its discretion or misapplies 
principles of law. Fletcher v. Fletcher, Utah, 
615 P.2d 1218 (1980); Carter v. Carter Utah, 563 
P.2d 177 (1977) Watson v. Watson, Utah, 561 P.2d 
1072 (1977); Eastman v. Eastman, Utah, 558 P.2d 
514 (1976); Harding v. Harding, 26 Utah 2d 277, 
488 p. 2d 308 (1971). ii 
The record amply supports the trial court's decision 
that alimony would terminate upon plaintiff's marriage. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO SUPPORT PAYMENTS 
FOR THE MINOR CHILD NEIL AS ACCRUED FROM THE 
TIME OF HIS VOLUNTARY REMOVAL FROM PLAINTIFF'S 
CUSTODY TO THE RESIDENCE OF DEFENDANT. 
Although recognition is duly granted to the rule that 
the divorce decree fixes the support obligations between 
parties, and that they cannot modify or change their 
obligations by their conduct, it is also recognized that 
specific circumstances may make adjustments necessary. 
In Stanton v. Stanton, 30 U.2d 315, 320, 517 P.2d 1010 
(1974) this court stated: 
"However, in matters concerning the custody and 
support of children, because of their highly 
equitable nature, it is appropriate for the trial 
court to take into consideration the entire 
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circumstances in making any order of enforcement 
of the decree, by contempt or otherwise, having in 
mind his equitable powers, to make any adjustment 
he may think fair and justified." 
Courts have recognized that it may be unjust to require 
a father to pay child support payments to a former spouse 
when the child has come to live with his father. 
Recognizing the equities of such a situation the court in 
Nabors v. Nabors (Ala.Civ.App. 1978) 354 So 2d 277 declared: 
"When an order requires a divorced husband to make 
periodic payments for the support of children and 
he has supported the children while they lived 
with him, the wife cannot recover payments for 
support during that period, nor during the period 
third persons were supporting the children or the 
children were supporting themselves." 
A case on nearly all fours with the instant dispute is 
found in Strum v. Strum, 317 NE 2d 59 (Ill.App.1974). There 
a sixteen year 11 month old girl left the custody of her 
mother to live with her father. One year later, the mother 
brought suit to recover the support accrued under the child 
support decree. The court ruled that the mother's conduct 
presented a situation where equitable estoppel should apply 
to prevent recovery. Specifically, the court said: 
"It seems abundantly clear that the plaintiff 
either consented to or acquiesced in Cynthia 
living with her father and he was supporting her. 
She became eighteen years of age August 11, 1972 
and at the time of the hearing on the rule to show 
cause was past eighteen years of age. It was not 
until July of 1972 that any question of 
termination of payments for her support was 
raised. [she had left her mother's custody in 
July of 1971]. Under these circumstances, it is 
our opinion that this situation is appropriate for 
the doctrine of equitable estoppel and that as to 
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Cynthia, the trial court properly dismissed the 
petition for a rule to show cause". 
A close scrutiny of Strum reveals a surprising 
similarity of facts with those of the instant matter. In 
both cases a child, within approximately one year of gaining 
majority, decides to live with his non-custodial parent. 
That parent supports the child until it reaches its majority 
one year later. The custodial parent delays action to 
recover support for nearly one year or longer. Strum 
obtained this delay by not filing suit; Mrs. Shaw filed 
suit, two months after the departure, to recover alimony 
payments. The subject of Neil's support was not raised in 
that complaint, instead his support was raised in trial some 
14 months after the filing of the alimony complaint. 
The equities of the instant case are sufficient to 
remove it from application of the general rule. First, the 
appellant's suit of September 1980 was to recover alimony. 
Subsequently, appellant obtained a series of continuances of 
the matter for fourteen months. The respondent was 
blameless in this causing of delay. The presence of the 
suit prevented the respondent from obtaining a timely 
modification of the custody which would have formally 
relieved him of the obligation to make Neil's child support 
payments. Appellant's behavior resulted in 
defendant-respondent's supporting Neil for a full year 
without the benefit of legal sanction. 
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Appellant's cited case law is deficient in the present 
case. The situations involved there consisted of instances 
where the supporting parent assumed support for short 
periods of tirnei e.g. weekends, weeks, and at most three 
months. Here, Mr. Shaw has supported his son for more than 
a full year, a considerably longer period of time. 
Justifiably, the expenses of a weekend and such short 
periods of time should not be subtracted from the support 
obligation. The inclusion of such would cause a disruption 
in budgeting. In the instant case, a full year of support 
does not present these issues. Instead, an allowance of the 
petition would result in a windfall allowance to appellant, 
in reality an unjust enrichment. 
The trial court clearly perceived that under the facts 
of the present case no child support arrearage should be 
given to Mrs. Lord, since she accepted Neil's decision to 
live with his father and Mr. Shaw paid all of Neil's 
expenses. 
''I am going to talk about child support next. The 
provisions in the decree are clear as to child 
support. That it will be $75 per child per month 
under certain circumstances. One circumstance, of 
course, is that up to the time they become 18 
years of age and the other, if they are in school. 
I think generally inherent in this is, of course, 
the plaintiff in this case [is] also supporting 
him. On about August 1st of 1980 the plaintiff 
ceased to support the one child, Neil, and has 
asked for child support because there was no 
[change made in the] decree. 
Now, of course, these matters were initially filed 
shortly thereafter in this court. I won't look up 
the exact date, but my memory tells me that it was 
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somewhere in September of 1980 that this action 
began, roughly 15 months before we get into court 
for trial and for a final hearing on it. And I 
suppose if the matter had been heard back 15 
months ago or someplace close to that, that the 
decree could have been amended if the Court 
decided it was appropriate. The court is going to 
think it proper that the defendant should not be 
required to pay support for the child while he is 
actually supporting the child, and though the 
decree provides for a specific amount of child 
support, the Court should amend that decree order 
-- directing it to be effective as of August 1st, 
1980. Of course, in this area this is an 
equitable doctrine to try to take the burden off 
or put a burden on the proper parties. The 
plaintiff has an obligation to support just as the 
defendant does. I am not trying to lift it off of 
one shoulder and place it on the other. 
(T.174-175) (see also R.365 paragraph 10). 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFF HAS NOT SHOWN A SUBSTANTIAL 
CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES; THEREFORE 
CHILD SUPPORT SHOULD NOT BE INCREASED. 
Appellant's position contends that the trial court 
abused its discretion by failing to find a sufficient change 
of circumstances to permit a modification of child support 
payments. 
The standard to determine whether child support should 
be increased is whether there has been a substantial change 
of circumstances from the situation existing at the time of 
the divorce. see King v. King, 29 Utah 2d 436, 511 P.2d 155 
(1973). 
on appeal the standard used is that the decision of the 
trial court on a petition for an increase in child support 
will not be disturbed unless it appears that the evidence so 
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preponderates against the trial court's findings that 
inequity or injustice would result. see Owen v. Owen, Utah, 
579 P.2d 911, (1978). 
As the court noted in OWen decision: 
" •.. due to the advantaged position and 
the responsibilities of the trial court 
in such-matters, we will accord some verity 
to his actions; and we will not disturb his 
findings nor the determination made thereon 
unless it appears that the evidence prepon-
derates against them so that an inequity or 
injustice has resulted." 579 P.2d at 913. 
The Owen case is insightful for many of the contentions 
raised by appellant. There the plaintiff argued for 
increased support on the basis of inflation, the changing 
needs of growing children and the feeling that plaintiff 
deserved a better class of living environment. Similar 
attention was also given to the increased salary of the 
defendant husband. 
The Owen case also gave other guidelines to use in 
determining proper support payments. First, both the mother 
and the father are responsible for the support of children; 
second, the issue for the court to adjudicate was the needs 
of the children and not necessarily the manner and standard 
of living desired by the plaintiff; third, while an increase 
in the father's income is important, it is only to be 
considered along with the other facts and circumstances 
concerning the needs of the children and the ability of the 
parents to pay for them; fourth, the past payment record of 
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father can be used to judge the equities as between the 
parties and the welfare of the children. 
At trial the court found that at the time of the 
divorce Mrs. Lord was making $150.00 per month, she now 
makes over $500.00 per month; the court found that while the 
plaintiff's housing costs have gone up, they have 
voluntarily increased so plaintiff and her husband could 
live in a more expensive home. The court also found that 
while the defendant's gross income increased, his take home 
income only slightly increased, and while the defendant may 
not have a legal obligation to do so, he is solely 
supporting the three older children. (R. 364-367}. 
In stating his oral decision the court made these 
comments: 
"The changed circumstances, of course, really came 
with the marriage, the remarriage of plaintiff 
Lord in 1980, July 1. In September of that year 
they purchased a new home. While necessity may 
have required that, they get a larger house for 
the children that would be more expensive than in 
the apartment that Mr. Lord was currently renting. 
There is nothing that required them, of course, to 
buy an $ 8 0 , 0 0 0 home ... " ( T • 176 } • 
"All of this that I am saying persuades the Court, 
however, that though the plaintiff's expenses have 
gone up considerably, they voluntarily gone up, 
and I suppose that if perhaps -- a poor example, 
but I suppose if a person had a hundred thousand 
dollar income per year, they could show where the 
amount expended per child well might grow 
proportionately, and if it were $50,000 income, it 
would be some proration less. If it were 25, it 
would be some proration less, but it would always 
grow as the income grows, because people just 
normally, not always, but normally, spend more 
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both on themselves and children as this takes 
place. They perhaps -- well, I won't go into more 
detail. All of this persuades me that there has 
not been shown before the Court today a change of 
circumstances such as would justify the Court in 
changing the original award of $75 per month per 
child. Cost of living, obviously, has made the 
cost of -- without all these other things -- has 
made the cost to the plaintiff go up. The 
defendant has, obviously, had an income increase, 
gross income increase of almost $4,000. He has 
testified that the net increase is very slightly 
above what it was initially at the time of the 
divorce. He has three children in his home to 
support, but has no legal obligation to support 
them under our law, and yet, I recognize parents 
do take that responsibility upon themselves to 
support to sorne degree, if not a major portion of 
the support, for adult children when they are 
living in the home. Just as I would if they were 
in my home. And it's complimentary to the 
parents, but it's not a fact that the Court can 
take into account so far as changed circumstances 
go. But, even all of those things being 
considered and discountina the three children in 
the home, I don't think that there has been a 
showing that the defendant's circumstances have 
changed enough that would justify the change of 
the order above the $75 a month per child." 
(T-177-179). 
The plaintiff in her brief attempts to show her income 
at the time of the divorce was significantly more than the 
trial court found. But counsel admits on page 5 of his 
brief that such evidence was not introduced at trial. 
It is clear that the trial court's findings and 
decision are not only supported but are mandated by the 
actual evidence introduced at trial. 
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POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DIVISION OF PROCEEDS 
FROM THE SALE OF THE HOME SHOULD BE 
AFFIRMED. 
The original divorce decree provided for the division 
of proceeds from the sale of the home. The decree provided: 
"The Plaintiff will be awarded the permanent and 
exclusive occupancy of the parties' home located 
at 2728 North 600 East, North Ogden, Utah. Title 
to the house will remain in the joint name (sic) 
of the parties until such time as they divide the 
equity. The Defendant will continue to make a 
monthly house payment of $250.00 for a period of 
three years. At the end of that time, the parties 
agree to divide the equity in the home equally. 
Payment of the Defendant's equity will be made 
upon the occurance of any one of the following 
events: 
a. The voluntary sale of the home by the 
Plaintiff. 
b. The remarriage of the Plaintiff. 
c. The youngest child having reached the 
age of 18. 
No interest will accumulate on the Defendant's 
equity. During the period of three years in which 
the Defendant makes the house payment, he will be 
able to claim any and all tax deductions as long 
as he is current on the payments." (R.217). 
The plaintiff married Robert L. Lord on July 1, 1980. 
Technically the defendant was entitled to his one-half of 
the equity at that time. However, realizing that the 
plaintiff desired to move to Salt Lake City, the parties 
placed the home for sale. An earnest money agreement was 
entered into with the parties, as sellers, and a Mr. & Mrs. 
Price, as buyers. (Def. Ex 6 p.2). 
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The home was sold and the parties received over 
$34,000.00 as their equity. The plaintiff and her husband 
refused to disburse Mr. Shaw's money to him and threatened 
not to complete the sale. (T.100-101). During this same 
time the tort action and this action were filed and in order 
to save the house sale, Mr. Shaw accepted their demand to 
place the entire proceeds in a trust account until this 
legal matter was heard. (He obviously did not know the 
legal proceedings could be prolonged such that it would be 
years until he received his share of the money.) 
The trial court started with the premise that the 
proceeds from the sale of the home should be divided equally 
between the parties; and explicitly ruled that the costs of 
repair were to be submitted by affidavit within ten days, 
(T.180). 
The court then gave each party certain credits before 
the division. At the time of trial all parties finally 
agreed to the rent and repair credits. (T.192). 
The court's decision as reflected in the ''Findings of 
Fact" was that Mrs. Lord should receive credits of a) $60.00 
for back child support, b) $166.48 for adjustment of rent 
and child support for September 1980; c) $225.00 for October 
1980; and d) $564.00 which was deducted from the repair 
costs of the driveway; the plaintiff was also allowed 
$503.93 for her share of the home repairs. Mrs. Lord's 
total credits were $1,519.41. (R.367-368). 
28 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Mr. Shaw was given credits of a) $550.00 to equalize 
savings withdrawals made on April 17, 1981; b) $125.00 for 
rent received by Mrs. Lord in August 1980; and c) $130.70 
for his costs of repair to the home. Mr. Shaw's total 
credits were $805.70. 
The difference in the credits each received was 
$713.71. The court thus ruled Mrs. Lord was to first 
receive $713.71 and the balance in the account was to be 
divided equally. 
The court specifically ruled that all repair costs were 
to be submitted within 10 days of the trial. (T.180). The 
plaintiff in her brief argues that the court failed to 
consider her supplemental affidavit claiming expenses of 
$2,589.61. The record clearly shows, however, that the 
supplemental affidavit was not filed until January 14, 1982, 
(R.358) nearly a month after the hearing and ten days after 
the Judge had ruled on the repair costs. (R.350). 
It is also submitted that even if it was error to 
determine repair costs by affidavit rather than through 
shown witnesses or other evidentiary means, that such an 
error was waived by the plaintiff at the original hearing 
when it was agreed by both parties to submit such costs by 
affidavit. (T.180). 
The plaintiff further waived any claimed errors made by 
the court by failing to appear at the April 5, 1982 hearing. 
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The April 5, 1982 hearing was set at the specific 
request of the plaintiff by her husband who personally 
appeared before the trial court. (R.456). One of the very 
purposes for holding the hearing on that date was to resolve 
any questions as to what costs were allowable. (T. 4-5) • 
The plaintiff cannot fail to appear at a hearing and then 
argue that she be allowed another hearing on remand to 
determine the very issues which she chose not to pursue 
prior to her appeal. 
POINT V 
THE INSTANT APPE.A.L SHOULD BE DISMISSED 
AS PREMATURE; AND ALL FINDINGS AND ORDEHS 
ENTERED AFTER THE NOTICE OF APPEAL WERE 
FILED SHOULD STAND. 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allow for an appeal 
to be taken under the provisions of Rule 72. Therein it 
states: 
'' (a) An ar>peal may be taken to the 
Supreme Court from all final orders and 
judgments; in accordance with these 
1 " ru es .... 
Conformance to the rule demands that the judgment 
appealed be final. The Utah court was required to interpret 
this finality requirement in Peterson v. Ohio Copper co, 
Utah, 266 P.1050 (1928). There the appellant had filed a 
notice of appeal one day after motioning for a new trial. 
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The motion had not been acted upon by the court. In 
refusing to hear the appeal the court said: 
"The constitution of this state 
(Art.8 Sec. 9) as interpreted by this 
court, permits of (sic) an appeal to this court 
from a judgment of the district court only 
in cases where the judgment of the district 
court is final. The question therefore is, 
when does the judgment of a district court 
for purposes of an appeal become final in a 
case where there is a motion for a new trial 
reasonably made after the entry of the 
judgment or decree? 
The uniform holding of this court in such cases 
has been that the judgment becomes final when the 
motion for a new trial is overruled. 
Consequently, the effect of a motion for a new 
trial, when seasonably made, is to suspend the 
judgment or decree for purposes of appeal 
until the motion has been disposed of." 
266 P. at 1050. 
Similar logic is found in the case of First National 
Bank v. Nielson, 60 Utah 227, 208 P.522. (1922). There the 
court said: 
"This court, in an unbroken line of decisions, 
has held that, where a motion for a new trial 
has been seasonably filed, the motion 
suspends the finality of the judgment, ... and 
that while the motion is pending and undeter-
mined an appeal is premature. 208 P at 523. 
(emphasis added) 
Support is found for this position in Bowman v. Ogden 
City, 33 Utah 196, 93 P 561 (1908); and Watson v. Mayberry, 
15 Utah 265, 49 P 479 (1897). 
The Peterson court, in dismissing an argument on the 
procedural interrelationship of motion for new trial and 
notice of appeal noted: 
"If it should be contended that the taking 
of the appeal was in effect a waiver or aban-
donment of the motion for a new trial it is 
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doubtful if such contention would be sound. 
Waiver must be intentional. 40 eye. 264. The 
same is true of abandonment. 1 eye. 5. Appellant 
had no intention either to waive or abandon his 
motion for a new trial because he assigns the 
overruling of the motion as error. id at 1052 
The Utah position of classifying an appeal as premature if 
taken while a motion for new trial is undisposed of is 
consonant with the holdings of many other jurisdictions. In 
4A CJS Appeal and Error §461 pg. 155 the annotator lists 
support as including decisions from Alabama, Colorado, 
Georgia, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, 
Nebraska, North Carolina, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma and 
Pennsylvania. 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 73(a) presently 
provides for a suspension of the time period allowed for 
filing of notice of appeal, upon the submission of timely 
motions under rules 50(b), 52(b) and 59. Rule 50(b) allows 
for a granting or denying a motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict. Rule 52(b) entails motions to 
amend or make additional findings of fact whether or not an 
alteration of the judgment would be required if the motion 
is granted. Rule 59 allows the alteration or amendment, or 
the making of new findings and conclusions and also allows a 
motion for a new trial. 
In light of the past decisions providing that a 
judgment is not final pending a Motion for New Trial, it 
seems apparent that prematurity should also attach to any 
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appeal taken while motions under Rules SO(b), 52(b) and 59 
are undisposed of. The suspension of the appeal time period 
by Rule 73(a) indicates that the judgment remains 
indefinite, and that continued litigation in the district 
court is a reality. Rule 73(a) should be viewed as an 
adoption of Peterson and an extension of that case's 
doctrine to the question of prematurity as applicable to the 
motions available under Rules 50(b), 52(b) and 59. 
It is also clear that the hearing set for April 5, 1981 
was set at the time the extension of time for filing appeal 
was filed (R.456). For these reasons it is submitted that 
the appeal was filed prematurely. 
It is the respondent's position that this court in its 
discretion may dismiss any appeal that is filed prematurely. 
In Wood v. Turner, 18 Utah 2d 229, 231, 419 P.2d 634 
1966 this court stated: 
"The premature filing of the notice of appeal such 
as was done in this case should not be regarded as 
a defect which will ipso facto entirely deprive 
the appellate court of jurisdiction. It is an 
irregularity which would be grounds for dismissal 
of the appeal within the discretion of the court. 
Such remedy would undoubtedly be well advised in 
the cases where the judgment had not become 
definite, or had not become final, or where 
remedies before the trial court had not been 
exhausted." 
There really isn't any dispute that the remedies before 
the trial court had not been exhausted since the court and 
the defendant were prepared and appeared for the April 5, 
1981 hearing to get a final judgment on the motion and 
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request filed by the plaintiff. For these reasons it is 
submitted there was a premature filing of an appeal and the 
appeal should be dismissed. 
Another ground for the dismissal of this ap~eal is the 
refusal of the appellant to comply with the condition 
imposed for the extension of time to file the appeal. 
~hen Mr. Lord appeared before the trial court on March 
3, 1982 and filed the plaintiff's "Motion and Order For 
Extension of Time to File Notice of Appeal" he represented 
and the motion stated, "Defendant will suffer no prejudice 
if the time is extended, and it would be in the interest of 
justice to grant the additional time." {R.377). 
nr. Shaw strongly disagreed that the extension would 
not prejudice him. 
The granting of an extension under Rule 73{a) to file 
an appeal is a discretionary function of the trial court, 
and inherent with that discretion is the right to impose any 
conditions deemed to be in the interest of justice, 
including imposing a condition nunc pro tune. see Neuringer 
v. Wortman, Mont., 607 P.2d 543 {1980); Grover v. Hawthorne, 
Oregon, 121 P. 804 {1912). 
After the defendant appeared on the April 5, 1981 
hearing the trial court ruled as follows: 
"That the extension of time granted to plaintiff 
in which to file a notice of appeal is conditioned 
upon the defendant being entitled to his share of 
the proceeds from the sale of the home. In this 
regard it is determined that $3,000.00 shall be 
placed in a special trust account with 
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Mountainwest Savings and Loan which cannot be 
withdrawn except upon joint signature of plaintiff 
and defendant, or upon further order of the Court, 
and the defendant is entitled to his one-half of 
the principal and accrued interest to date he 
withdraws his share, and the plaintiff is entitled 
to her one-half. The account number is number 
04-001637-14 which had a total of $34,629.13 as of 
April 5, 1982." (R. 454) • 
There was no doubt in the trial court's mind that this 
condition was fair and that the $3,000 would more than cover 
any adjustments to the division of proceeds, should this 
court reverse any part of the trial court's ruling. (T.10). 
The plaintiff has refused to comply with this 
requirement and the appeal should be dismissed since the 
imposition of the release of funds was made a condition to 
extending the time for appeal. 
POINT VI 
THE CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED TO THE TRIAL 
COURT FOR THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL. 
At the April 5, 1982 hearing the trial court made 
several findings regarding the conduct of this action by the 
plaintiff and her former counsel. Among these findings are 
the following: 
"3. The court thereafter was contacted by Robert 
Lord, husband of the plaintiff, who had formerly 
been an attorney of record, and who appears to 
really be the moving attorney in the matter. 
Mr. Lord presented a Motion and Order for 
Extension of Time to File an Appeal which was 
granted on March 3, 1982, copies of which are in 
the court file. Mr. Lord also requested a hearing 
date for plaintiff's motion. 
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4. Thereafter the plaintiff filed a Motion to 
Vacate the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
and Order and Judgment, and the defendant filed a 
response to the plaintiff's motion. The plaintiff 
further filed her proposed Findings and 
Conclusions with the court. 
5. The Court finds that the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law previously signed by this Court 
on February 5, 1982 do, in fact, represent the 
Findings of the Court and the decision of the 
Court, even though they were prepared by 
defendant's counsel at the court's request. 
6. The Court specifically finds that the 
proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
submitted by the plaintiff do not reflect the 
Findings of this Court, and in particular that 
paragraphs 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 19, 22, 23, 24, 25, 
and 28 do not represent Findings made by the 
Court. 
7. One of the purposes for holding the hearing 
on April 5, 1982 was to resolve any objections as 
to the court allowing evidence of costs to repair 
the home for sale, being submitted by affidavit. 
The court was prepared to allow testimony 
regarding the affidavits to see if the court's 
ruling was appropriate. The court finds the 
plaintiff has not chosen to pursue that matter by 
virtue of failing to appear and the objections of 
plaintiff are denied and deemed to be waived. 
8. The Court finds that the hearing set for 
April 5th was set at the request of the plaintiff 
and that the plaintiff failed to advise either the 
court or the defendant or defendant's counsel that 
plaintiff would not appear at said hearing. 
9. The Court finds that the plaintiff's Motion 
to Vacate the Findings and Conclusions is not in 
order and should therefore be denied. 
10. The Court finds that the plaintiff is 
entitled to an award of attorney's fees for 
appearing on this hearing, and in preparing 
special Findings and Conclusions and Orders in the 
sum of $390.00 and judgment may enter against the 
plaintiff for said amount. 
11. The Court finds that the plaintiff's 
affidavit for additional costs in repairing the 
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home is not in order and that the decision as 
reflected in the original Findings and Order 
signed by the Court reflects the amount of money 
the plaintiff is entitled to. 
12. The Court finds that the proceeds from the 
sale of the home are presently in a joint account 
requiring joint signature of plaintiff and 
defendant at Mountainwest Savings and Loan at the 
Branch Office located at 114 North Washington 
Boulevard, Ogden, Utah, and that the account 
number is 04-001637-14 and that there exists as of 
April 5, 1982 the sum of $34,629.13. 
13. The Court finds that even if an appeal is 
taken, the only amounts in dispute would be less 
than $3,000.00 from the savings account. 
14. The Court therefore finds that from the 
amount held by Mountainwest Savings & Loan there 
should be $3,000.00 placed in a trust account 
which cannot be released except upon joint 
signatures of the parties or upon order of this 
Court, and after the $3,000.00 is placed in the 
special trust account, that the defendant shall be 
entitled to one-half of the balance from the 
account. The plaintiff is entitled to the other 
half if she desires to withdraw the funds. 
15. The Court finds that Mountainwest Savings & 
Loan should disburse to the defendant his share of 
the money free and clear of any claim of the 
plaintiff. 
16. The Court further finds that disbursement of 
the money to the defendant is a condition to the 
order of extension of time in which to file the 
notice of appeal, granted on March 3, 1982. 
17. The Court finds that at the original hearing 
of this matter on December 18, 1981 there was 
testimony presented that the plaintiff's husband 
and former attorney of record, Robert Lord, made 
allegations that Mr. Lord would do everything he 
could to financially break the defendant. The 
Court finds that that's probably what Mr. Lord's 
attitude in the matter is, based upon the history 
of what has taken place in this court case since 
this District Judge has been involved." 
(R.475-477). 
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The Supplemental Order also contained the following 
order: 
"7. The actions of the plaintiff and Robert Lord, 
her husband and former attorney of record since 
this District Judge has been assigned this case, 
appear to be a deliberate effort to try to break 
the defendant financially and to use their legal 
position to punish the defendant, and have not 
been made in good faith." 
The actions of the plaintiff and her husband, who filed 
a petition in intervention, on appeal also seem revealing as 
to how they have tried to obstruct, delay, and run up legal 
costs of the defendant. In fact, this court in a previous 
motion assessed damages of $100.00 for appellant's failure 
to timely file her brief. 
Courts have stated that attorney fees are appropriate 
damages on appeal where the appellant has used dilatory 
tactics, where an appeal lacks merit, or where an appeal is 
made in bad faith. see Varnum v. Grady, Nev, 528 P.2d 1027 
(1974); Matter of Suesz Estate, Kansas, 613 P.2d 947 (1980); 
Hock v. Lienco Cedar Products, Mont, 634 P.2d 1174 (1981). 
"Where there was no probable cause for appeal by 
defendant from order refusing to set aside default 
judgment, and it appeared that appeal was part of 
long continued and calculated scheme by defendant 
to prevent enforcement of valid obligation for 
which defendant had no proper defense, award 
of .•• damages for delay resulting from appeal was 
warranted." Stirling v. Dari-Delite, Inc., 
Oregon, 494 P.2d 252 motion denied, 498 P.2d 753 
(1972). 
"Since disposition made by District Judge was 
faultless on the basis of prevailing law and there 
was no room for dispute, no reasonable cause 
existed for appeal; accordingly, the Supreme Court 
would impose a penalty, in addition to attorney 
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fees, without proof of pecuniary loss or other 
damage. Reno Livestock Corp. v. Sun Oil co., 
Wyoming, 638 P.2a 147 (1981) 
It is respectfully suggested that this case presents a 
situation where the matter should be remanded to the trial 
court for an award of attorney fees for services rendered on 
appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
This record on appeal presents a rather bizarre episode 
of legal maneuverings in behalf of the plaintiff. While the 
legal proceedings have been prolonged and time consuming, 
they have also been costly to the defendant-respondent in 
that he has been denied the use of money he is legitimately 
entitled to from the proceeds of the sale of the family 
home, and he has been required to expend extensive money to 
defend himself in court against his former wife. 
It is submitted that the record on appeal amply 
supports the legal positions taken by the defendant. 
1. The terms of the divorce decree providing that the 
defendant paid alimony to the plaintiff automatically 
terminated upon the plaintiff's marriage. 
2. The plaintiff is not entitled to any child support 
payments for the minor child, Neil, which may have accrued 
from the time Neil voluntarily left his mother's home to 
reside with his father. 
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3. The plaintiff has not shown a substantial change 
of circumstances sufficient to increase the child support 
obligations paid by the defendant, and there has been no 
abuse of discretion by the trial court in refusing to 
increase child support. Also, there is no evidence 
presented on appeal to show that the trial court abused this 
discretion in failing to change the divorce decree as it 
relates to tax exemptions on the minor children for Federal 
and State income tax purposes. 
4. The trial court's division of proceeds from the 
sale of the home should be affirmed. The plaintiff should 
first be awarded the sum of $713.71 less the attorney fees 
awarded at the April 5, 1981 hearing of $390.00 less any 
awards of attorney's fees and costs allowed by this court on 
appeal. 
5. This appeal should be dismissed as having been 
filed prematurely, and all Findings and Orders entered after 
the notice of appeal were filed should stand, including the 
award of attorney's fees entered in the April 5, 1981 
hearing. 
6. Because of the plaintiff's frivilous appeal, 
dilatory action in processing the appeal, and evidence that 
the appeal was filed in bad faith, this matter should be 
referred back to trial court for the award of attorney's 
fees to the defendant for his fees paid in defending himself 
on appeal. 
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Respectfully submitted this 22 day of December, 1982. 
MANN, HADFIELD & THORNE 
By~-""~~~;_..~----------------J e • T orne 
Att ney for Respondent 
P • O • Box "F " 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
fWp /'lS I hereby certify that I mailed/ true and correct copy-
of the foregoing Brief of Responden , postage prepaid, to 
Lowell V. Summerhays, 420 Continental Bank Building, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84101 this .... z~day of December, 1982. 
~~~~~ Pegg~==on;Secretary 
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